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ROBERT LAYTON*

Arbitration in International
Commercial Agreements:
The Noose Draws Tighter
Corporate counsel faced with negotiating complex transactions between
companies located in different countries are always met with the problem of
providing for an effective dispute-settling mechanism. For years arbitration has
been the favored solution. A variety of agencies and rules are available for the
administrative supervision of any arbitration between entities located in
different parts of the world. However, arbitration itself has certain inherent
disadvantages of which many of us are aware.' Counsel often thought that they
would worry about avoidance of an unpalatable arbitration somewhat later in
the game. It has recently been made quite clear that once arbitration has been
chosen, escape from the international arbitration clause is a result virtually
impossible to accomplish. 2
By a 5-4 vote, the United States Supreme Court has given its imprimatur to
favoring arbitration in the international context where its decision prevented
assertion of claims under the federal securities laws. Alberto Culver, an
American company incorporated in Delaware and based in Illinois, had sought
to avoid arbitration under an international agreement on the ground that the
federal securities laws gave it the right to litigate in the federal courts its
claims that it had been defrauded in buying a complex of business rights. In
expanding its overseas operations, Alberto Culver had brought from Scherk, a
German citizen, certain trademarks and the outstanding securities of two
companies organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein. The
contract, which was negotiated in the United States, England and Germany,
closed in Switzerland and contained a "broad" arbitration clause,3 as well as
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'E.g., Washington Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. The Washington Post Co., 442 F.2d
1234, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

'See, for example, the recent decision in L/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 50
F.2d 424 (2d. Cir. 1974), where the Court found the reasoning of an arbitral panel to be based on a
clearly erroneous interpretation of the contract, but nonetheless refused to vacate an award
entered thereon.
'E.g., as follows: "any controversy or claim [that] shall arise out of this agreement or the breach

thereof" will be referred to arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris,
France; it also provided and that the laws of Illinois should govern the agreement.
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express warranties that the trademarks were unencumbered. Upon later
discovery that the trademarks were encumbered, Alberto Culver asserted in a
complaint in the Federal District Court in Illinois that the purchase had been
induced by fraudulent representations in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-S thereunder. Scherk moved to stay the
action pending arbitration in France. The District Court denied the motion
and enjoined Scherk from proceeding to arbitration and was upheld by the
Court of Appeals.' The Supreme Court reversed and directed that the
arbitration provision be enforced.
In Scherk v. Alberto Culver Company,I the Court pointedly noted that with
respect to any contract touching two or more countries:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the form in which disputes shall be
litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable pre-condition
to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international
business transaction. Furthermore, such a provision obviates the danger that a
dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of
one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved.
To Justice Stewart of our Supreme Court the overriding consideration was
preventing damage to "the fabric of international commerce and trade" and
imperilling the "willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into
international commercial agreements." Most significant to the majority was the
fact that the subject matter of the contract concerned business enterprises
located abroad. In so doing, the Court departed from its prior decision in Wilko
v. Swan,6 where it had refused to compel arbitration in connection with a
domestic dispute in which one of the parties sought to enforce alleged rights
arising under the federal securities law which were claimed to override the
provisions of an arbitration clause in a brokerage agreement. Justice Stewart
held that in the context of an international contract the considerations which
motivated the Court in Wilko become chimerical because the availability of
speedy resort to foreign courts could hinder access to the American court chosen
by a defrauded purchaser. In sum, the Supreme Court in the Alberto Culver
case held that the agreement of parties to arbitrate "any dispute arising out of
their international commercial transactions" would be respected and enforced
by the federal courts.
The significant conclusion to be drawn from Alberto Culver is that once
corporate counsel have acceded to a broad arbitration and forum selection
clause, the prospect of ever avoiding resolution of any dispute before a panel of

1484 F.2d 611.
1417 U.S. 506 (1974).
'346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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arbitrators is gone. Claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract itself are
exclusively for the arbitrators as are claims of frustration or termination of the
contract.

7

The trend of the Court's thinking in this direction was forecast by its refusal
in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company,8 to set aside a forum-selection

clause in an international towage contract between a Houston-based American
corporation and a German corporation which provided that all disputes "be
treated before the London Court of Justice." The expansion of overseas
commercial activities by United States companies in an era of expanding
international trade led the Court to conclude that where two parties freely
negotiate an international commercial agreement they will not escape specific
enforcement of the selection of a foreign court submission, absent an
overwhelming showing of unreasonableness, unfairness or injustice. "We
cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts." 9
The question presented thereafter, however, is how important the use of the
broad forum selection clause becomes in negotiating a substantial international
agreement. Obviously, the advantages of arbitration are the predictability of the
forum in which the parties may eventually find themselves, and predictability
with respect to the law which may be applied, as well as some of the procedures,
which can be controlled by selection of a particular administering organ such as
the International Chamber of Commerce.
It is worth giving serious consideration to the possibility of separating out
certain types of disputes which are susceptible of being arbitrated by their very
nature, from other types of disputes which United States businessmen are
extraordinarily reluctant to leave to arbitrators. The Alberto Culver case is a
good example. In the ordinary course of negotiation, one can expect problems to
arise with regard to such matters as actual performance of the contract, delivery
dates, quality of goods that are delivered, payments, and technical questions
that require interpretation under the agreement. However, when one discovers
at a later point and time the possibility that a fundamental fraud or misrepresentation may have occurred, the prospect of having such a claim arbitrated is
somewhat frightening. By tradition and history, American lawyers are
conditioned to presenting such claims in a court of law, where if their proof and
claims are legally sufficient, the prospect exists of securing a binding ruling
which may avoid the compromise nature of arbitration awards.

'Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F.Supp 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); affd. 489
F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973).
'407 U.S. 1 (1972).
'407 U.S. at 9.
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To a large extent, the selection of arbitration itself, forum, law to be applied,
and the type of arbitrators to be appointed, depends to a remarkable degree on
the nature of the several contracting parties. For present purposes, the general
rule that may be kept in mind is that where the contracting parties are sizeable
corporations, each with relatively equal bargaining power, and reputations and
interests for the future in conducting international trade, the risks of being
completely taken advantage of in the arbitral setting are minimized. However,
where the contract by its nature is one-sided, i.e., where the contracting parties
are not of equal bargaining power, where one of the parties is extremely
unsophisticated, or has the potential of subjecting its counterpart to an
unfriendly forum, to unfriendly courts and to a strange legal system, arbitration
does not necessarily present a solution.
The prime danger of arbitration is that it may subject a corporation to
specious or largely fabricated claims on the theory that somehow the panel of
arbitrators will award something to the claiming party, whether out of
sympathy, or out of desire to "split the baby," or out of a tendency not to leave
one side completely unhappy. Such a result can be prevented by skillful ground
rules set forth in an arbitration clause. One obvious solution is to provide that in
the appointment of arbitrators, at least two out of three arbitrators shall be
lawyers of a distinguished character selected from specified panels. Another
solution is selection of an administering authority whose procedural rules and
reputation are such that a fair amount of predictability and confidence is
engendered in the course of supervision of the arbitral process. Particularly,
corporations will have had differing experiences with entities such as the
International Chamber of Commerce, the World Bank Centre for Settlement of
Investment disputes, or the ICE rules:
Insufficient consideration has been given, however, to the possibility of
restricting arbitration to the narrower areas in which technical expertise can
truly make a contribution. For example, it is quite clear that the benefit of
having experts in the particular subject areas of a commercial contract serving
as dispute settlers is quite plain. Yet having such persons making
determinations of fundamental questions such as, inducement to enter into a
contract by fraudulent means, basic misrepresentations or claims of material
breach of agreements, is unsatisfactory. American businessmen would clearly
prefer to have such claims determined in a legal context. The dilemma could be
resolved by using a narrow and carefully defined arbitration clause with respect
to settlement of technical questions involving performance, payments,
compliance with terms of the agreement from a technical point of view, and by
specifying that recognized experts in addition to a lawyer would serve as dispute
settlers for those purposes, while carefully reserving to a legal forum any other
and more fundamental questions which can expose a company to large damage
claims or substantial threats to its commercial relations. Where a narrow and
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 9, No. 4
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carefully defined arbitral provision is employed, the parties may be able to
expect a speedy and relatively inexpensive dispute settlement which would
permit them to negotiate remaining commercial differences and to proceed with
any activities left to be performed. However, once arbitration is sought as a
fundamental remedy in substantial money claims or for substantial questions as
to performance arising out of a relationship which will continue in the future, a
serious question arises as to whether the international arbitration process is
either speedy or inexpensive. Many have found arbitration in the international
context to be expensive, lengthy and unsatisfactory from the standpoint of
resolving specific disputes where large amounts are at stake.
Often the solution to a search for a dispute-settlement mechanism is to pick
none at all, thus leaving both parties faced with the unpleasant prospect of
litigation in an unfriendly forum unfamiliar with the subject matter of the
agreement. The Supreme Court has characterized this possibility as awarding
the race to the diligent.10 However, absent forum selection or arbitration, both
sides are under substantial pressures to settle their disputes by negotiation
rather than by the prospect of litigation either in the other party's backyard
where expense, delay and a possibly unfavorable result may be anticipated; or
where uncertainty cannot be tolerated. The litigated solution is unacceptable in
commercial transactions in certain parts of the world such as the Soviet Bloc
countries or Red China.11 However, in most ordinary commercial contacts, the
absence of any dispute-settling procedure may be an appropriate method of
discouraging parties from failing to resolve questions by negotiation.
On the assumption that some arbitration provision, whether broad or narrow,
is required in order to complete the transaction, counsel should give
consideration to modifications of the standard arbitration provision so as to
decrease the disadvantages of the arbitration proceedings. In order to assure
that any award rendered as the result of international arbitration may speedily
be enforced, the clause should express agreement by the parties that "any award
made shall be complied with and may be entered as a judgment in any
jurisdiction." In the absence of such language, United States courts have held
that under the Federal Arbitration Act judgment may not be rendered on an
award in Federal district courts pursuant to a contractual provision which did
not contain language evidencing the intention of the parties that judgment be
rendered thereon in any court in any jurisdiction. 12

1094 S. Ct. 2455-56.

"The Soviets to date have preferred arbitration in Sweden with the President of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce appointing the arbitrator. STRAuss, THE GROWING CONSENSUs ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra at p.710.
"IVarleyv. Tarrytown Associates, Inc., 477 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1973). However, recently
where the

parties have by conduct or in some manner other than specific language (use of Federal court power
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The procedural law to govern the conduct of the proceeding, as well as the
substantive law, should be specified; otherwise substantial precedent exists for
implying that the procedural rules of the country or province where the award is
made will apply. If the parties have not specified the locale either, this
significant decision and others will be made by the administering agency.13
Oftentimes under the procedural rules of the administrative agency
supervising the arbitration (such as ICC), the parties enter into "terms of
reference" by which they specify particular ground rules. It is not unusual in
such a document for the parties once again to agree to "comply in all respects
with any award rendered by the arbitrators." However, there is much slippage
between the rendering of an award and the time when a check is issued to the
prevailing party. For that reason among others, after many years of experience,
the principal commercial nations, members of the United Nations, drafted the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 4
Congress in 1970 implemented that Convention by passing Chapter II of the
United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Section 201 ff. The goal of the
Convention was to unify the treatment given to Commercial arbitration
agreements in international contracts and to aid in their speedy enforcement.
Nonetheless, on the assumption that an appropriate award has been rendered in
favor of a prevailing party, should the losing party, whether a foreign
corporation or not, resist or simply refuse to honor the award, proceedings must
be instituted in the courts of the losing party's country for enforcement of the
award. Enforcement proceedings add an additional and expensive aspect to the
litigation process. IIFor example, under the Convention as adopted by the United
States, a resisting party has at least four, and possibly five, defenses available to
it upon being sued in a Federal District Court. The assumption of the rules of
procedure of most administrative arbitration associations is that the parties will
comply in good faith with any award rendered by a majority of the arbitrators or
by a single arbitrator. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Consideratiopn
should, therefore, be given to providing that both parties to any arbitration must
post security in the nature of a bond with the arbitration association in question
to ensure that any award rendered may be collected out of such a bond. The
advantage of such a provision would be to discourage unnecessary resistance to
the enforcement of an award. On the other hand, where a corporation is
compelled to enter into an arbitration clause much against its better judgment,

to appoint an arbitrator, or a motion to vacate an award) evidenced an intention to have judgment
entered by a Federal court, their consent has been implied. Stavborg v. National Metal Converters,
supra. Such problems may be avoided by clearly providing for entry of judgment.
"See Cohn, The Rules of Arbitrationof The InternationalChamber of Commerce, Vol. 14 INTL.
AND CoMP. L.Q. 150-52 (Jan. 1965).
149 U.S.C. Ch. 2, T.I.A.S. 6997.
"See Cohn, supra n. 13 at pp. 165-68.
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the posting of such security would be substantially to its disadvantage. As
indicated above, if it refuses to comply with an award which has been entered
against it, and there are insufficient assets to be levied against in the other
party's country, a proceeding must be brought in its own home territory to
enforce the award. Under Article V, several defenses are available against
enforcement of an international arbitration award. They very type of challenge
raised by Alberto Culver in the Scherk case would be available to Alberto Culver
in challenging enforcement of the award. 16 It might also be argued that the
procedures employed by the arbitrators themselves were not in accord with the
procedures set forth in the agreement or that recognition or enforcement of the
award is contrary to the public policy of the enforcing country. Most recently an
American corporation, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas, Inc., lost an
arbitration proceeding to an Egyptian corporation over an agreement to
construct, start up, manage and supervise a paperboard mill in Alexandria,
Egypt. Parsons sought a declaratory judgment to prevent enforcement of the
award and the Egyptian company counterclaimed for enforcement of the award
under the Convention. The American company raised four defenses available to
it under Article V (1) and (2) of the Convention, as well as the claim that the
award was "in manifest disregard of law." All of the defenses were rejected by
the District Court whose decision was recently affirmed by the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.'
The Court noted that the American corporation had the burden of proof in
resisting enforcement of the award" and, after analysis of the legislative history
of the Convention and the United States enabling legislation, concluded that
defenses against enforcement should all be construed narrowly. There,
severance of United States-Egyptian diplomatic relations and withdrawal of
AID financing of the project were rejected as a public policy defense on the
ground that equating "national" policy with basic notions of morality and
justice constituted a parochial device that would undermine the Convention's
utility. Similarly, the Court rejected the claims that (1) United States foreign
policy issues made the subject matter non-arbitrable, (2) that the United States
company was "unable to present" its case before the arbitrators since the
speaking schedule of one of its witnesses did not enable him to attend the
hearings, (3) that the arbitrators exceeded their authority, or (4) that the award
was in manifest disregard of the law.
"See note 14, 94 Sup. Ct. 2449 at p. 2457.
'"Parsons & Whittemore Overseas, Inc. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA),
Nos. 174, 637,
F.2d
(Dec. 23, 1974), 43 LW 2298; text in 9 INT'L LAw. (1975)
pp. 545 ff.
"No doubt exists on this score. See Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United
Nations Coivention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE
LJ. 1049 (1961); G.W. HAIGHT, SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF RECORD OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE.
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The lesson of Parsons & Whittemore is plain that as the United States had
embarked on a policy favoring the supra-national emphasis of the Convention,
that policy would be enforced by the courts; and accordingly defenses against
confirmation of a foreign arbitral award will be strictly construed.
The Court noted that: "There is no special national interest in judicial, rather
than arbitral, resolution of," breach of contract claims in the international
breach of contract claims in the international context.
The Supreme Court observed that the United States cannot legislate that all
disputes involving international contracts must be determined by the standards
of justice which exist under United States law in preference to the laws of other
countries on the assumption that American standards of fairness are superior to
those prevailing elsewhere. The purpose of the Convention was to provide
speedy and effective enforcement of a controversy already decided by
arbitrators. It was further the intention of the Convention that courts of
signatory countries where enforcement is sought should not lightly decline
enforcement on the basis of parochial views as to the terms of the agreement or
the decision made by the arbitrators. 9 Nonetheless, the Convention provides
that recognition of an award may be refused when the arbitration agreement "is
not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it.' '2 °
Counsel should be aware that in specifying the law which will govern
interpretation of the contract itself, consideration should be given to such
matters as ultimate enforcement, public policy, and the subject matter of the
contract itself.2 The dissenting opinion in Alberto Culver would have found the
agreement to arbitrate a claim of securities fraud "null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed ' 22 on the theory that in Section 29(a) of the 1934
Securities and Exchange Act Congress had made agreements to arbitrate
liabilities under said Act "void" and "inoperative." However, the decision of the
majority makes clear that upon signing an international agreement containing a
broad arbitration provision, a litigant gives up its federal securities rights; and
arbitrators would be deciding whether securities fraud or misrepresentations in
the making of the agreement were insufficient to block enforcement of the
agreement. Additionally, the dissent noted that when relegated to the
arbitration process itself, a party effectively loses its right to the extensive
pre-trial discovery provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Additionally, most arbitral awards can be made without explication of reasons

"See HAIGHT, op. cit., note 18, supra, pp.24-28.
"Article V(1)(a).
"It must also be borne in mind that in the absence of specifying the locale for arbitration, the
law chosen may influence the decision by an administering agency or court as to locale. See
Aerojet-General Corporation v. American Arbitration Association F.2d (9th Cir. 1973).
2294 S. Ct. at p. 2461.
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and may also be made without development of a record. It may therefore be
extremely difficult to resist enforcement of the award in a Federal District
Court, not having had opportunity for pre-trial discovery in the arbitral process
itself and possibly not having a complete record of the proceedings which took
23
place or a reasoned opinion by the arbitrators.
An interesting question is raised upon the application for enforcement of an
award when the resisting party attempts to employ the full panoply of federal
pre-trial discovery in order to make out its defense that the award was in some
manner improperly arrived at, apart from simply disagreeing with the judgment
of the arbitrators. In Solitron Devices v. Territory of Curacao,24 the first decision
reported under the Convention, the proceeding was conducted entirely on the
basis of affidavits, as would appear to be required by construction of Title 9,
United States Code Section 6, which makes it clear that any applications are to
be treated as motions would be treated in the federal courts. Quaere, whether
anything but the most limited type of discovery is available in connection with
resisting a motion for confirmation, absent a factual showing which would
warrant broad Federal discovery procedures.
From the above, several basic considerations become evident:
1. Strong United States and international policy exists favoring arbitration as
a dispute-settling device on the theory of encouraging international business
transactions by American businessmen.
2. Upon signing a broad arbitration clause the American corporate
contractor waives most of the rights otherwise available to it which are created
by federal statute. The prospect noted by a footnote in the majority opinion in
Alberto Culver seems a very unlikely and unrewarding manner of vindicating
federal rights.
3. It is questionable that when actually engaged in arbitration anything
approaching the procedural rights ordinarily available to a United States
corporation in Federal litigation can be found through the administration of an
international arbitration.
4. Serious consideration should be given to using narrow rather than broad
arbitration provisions. In any terms of reference or compromise signed prior to
commencement of an arbitration, thought should be given to providing for
posting of security by the party seeking to arbitrate as well as by the party
resisting arbitration, and to providing for the imposition of penalties upon a
party delaying the arbitral process.

"See I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, supra at 429, where it is noted that the AAA
discourages the practice of written opinions in order to further insulate the arbitral process from
judicial review.
"'356F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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5. Since many negotiations will not permit the drafting of such complex or
sophisticated arbitration provisions, consideration ought to be given to simply
doing away with arbitration and providing that upon the claim by one party of a
breach of the agreement, the opposite party consents to suit in the Federal
District Court in which it does business or in the local foreign court in which it
conducts its business. Thus, the party seeking to litigate is exposed to the
expense of initiating suit in a foreign country and in the backyard of its opposite
number. While not entirely satisfactory this device should serve to discourage
the making of baseless claims or unnecessary resort to the litigating process.
6. Consideration should aslo be given to providing for continuation of
performance under an agreement, where essential or appropriate, while
arbitration or court resolutions are sought.
7. In choosing the law which will govern interpretation of an international
agreement itself, attention ought to be given to the law which will govern the
procedural aspects of arbitration. In the face of silence on that subject, it has
often been held that the procedural law of the physical place where arbitration
takes place will govern. Parties are often sorely disappointed when they find
that substantial aspects of their claims are adversely affected by such local
procedural law. 5 The preferred method would be to specify procedural law as
well as substantive law governing the contract provisions themselves.
8. Additionally, the arbitration clause should make clear whether partyappointed arbitrators are expected to be impartial and independent or whether
they are to be in the nature of the advocate of one of the parties. In the first case,
the arbitrator must disclose any financial or personal interest or even prior
connection with the party that appointed him and any other party, and during
the course of the proceedings his conduct must be above reproach and insulated
from his nominator. Any other conduct could serve as grounds for setting aside
the award. In the event of the party-appointed arbitrator being considered as
the advocate of a party, it is assumed that he has some contacts or connection
with the party appointing him and he may be thought of as the explicator of the
position taken by his nominator.
Finally, once the arbitration clause is inserted into an agreement, it is clear
from the trend of decisions that its impact will not lightly be avoided; hence
when the choice is made it should be an educated one.

2

j. Cohn, supra, n. 13 pp. 150-54.
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